We use the event study methodology to examine the stock returns' consequences of voluntary and mandatory transfer disclosures of football teams. We analyzed the effects of voluntary disclosures by using the announcement of intent to enter into negotiations on transfer. On the other hand, to announce signing a contract is considered as a mandatory disclosure because the local regulations obliged football teams to announce the transfers of football players. The results of the study show that stock returns have parallel pattern regarding the voluntary and mandatory disclosures. However stock returns reaction to voluntary disclosures is statistically significant where this proposition is not valid for the mandatory disclosures. The findings of study provide evidence for the theory proposing that stock returns react to voluntary disclosures when the mandatory disclosures are less informative.
I. INTRODUCTION
In accordance with the Communiqué VIII/54 of Capital Markets Board of Turkey (SPK,2009) , football teams must announce their football player transfers to public via Public Disclosure Platform (PDP). However, Communiqué VIII/54 does not include a regulation for the timing of transfer announcements. Football teams often announce that they enter into negotiations with football players. Announcements of negotiations require a second disclosure which states whether contract is signed or cancelled. In some cases, football teams prefer only to announce the contract conclusion without any pre-disclosure about the negotiations. At this point, we noticed that there are two types of announcements that football teams make; 1) Entering into negotiations 2) Signing a contract. Announcement of signing a contract is a mandatory disclosure while announcement of entering into negotiations is a voluntary disclosure.
The major question is that why football teams voluntarily disclose their negotiations with football players? 1) Mass media releases information about all the stages of transfers 2) Both true and false news is quite dominant in mass media. This structure increases the need for adequate, accurate and punctual information for investors. This paper analyzes the impact of voluntary disclosures on stock returns when football teams delay the delivery of accurate information to investors. Since football players are basic indicators for the success of the team, football teams may favor more voluntary disclosures to inform investors on time and avoid from false news. We used the event study methodology in order to research the impact of voluntary & mandatory transfer announcements on stock returns. We examined the announcements that are made on Public Disclosure Platform by four Turkish football teams listed on the Borsa Đstanbul (Istanbul Stock Exchange Market).
We found that the impact of negotiation announcements is much stronger than the announcements of signing a contract.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows; Section 2 reviews the literature related to the impact of voluntary disclosure on stock returns. Section 3 presents research questions of current study. The method of study is explained in Section 4. The results are presented in Section 5, and finally, summary and conclusion are discussed in section 6.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
KPMG publication on the Integrated Reporting (KMPG, 2012) focuses on the gap between the information reported by companies and the information that is necessary for investors in order to assess business prospects and value. This gap causes a valuation problem which implies that the executives of companies and investors have quite different perspective about the value of the company shares. Mandatory disclosures such earnings might be inadequate to fill this gap while voluntary disclosures can provide better results.
There is a wide range of theoretical and empirical studies which examine the impact of voluntary disclosures on the stock returns and valuation. Early studies focused on managers' earning forecasts. Patell (1976) , Waymire (1984) , Ajinkya and Gift (1984) showed that voluntary disclosures of earning forecasts have information content which means that forecasts of managers have significant impact on stock returns. Pownall and Waymire (1989) examined the stock price reactions to voluntary and mandatory disclosures and found that management forecasts lead a larger stock price effect than mandatory disclosures.
There is a consensus that stock returns react to the earnings. Özer (1996) examined this relation for the firms listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange Market and found consistent results with literature. On the other hand, there are certain conditions such as reporting losses or operating in high tech industry that make earnings less informative for the investors (Chen et al., 2002; Graham et al., 2005) . Chen et al. (2002) found that managers voluntarily disclose balance sheet when their earnings are less informative. Dedman et al. (2008) examined the UK biotechnology/ pharmaceutical sector.
Accounting standards for UK biotechnology/ pharmaceutical sector obligates firms for most of research and development investments to be recognized as an expense. Therefore, UK accounting standards leads lower reported earnings for the firms investing on research and development. Dedman et al. (2008) proved that voluntary disclosures related to product development have significant impact on the share prices. Dedman et al. (2008) Asymmetric information is the key concept which explains why higher disclosure level leads the better valuation of firm shares. Healy and Palepu (1993) addressed to conditions that are creating distortions in financial reports and leading misevaluation: 1) conflict of interest between the managers and investors, 2) information advantage of managers related to investors 3) lack of regulations and audit. It is well known by economists that these factors cause the asymmetric information problem.
The outcome of asymmetric information problem about the market price is firstly documented by Akerlof (1970) . Akerlof's (1970) proposition for automobile market possessing quality uncertainty can be generalized for the stock exchange markets as follow; "Owner of the good stock cannot receive the true value of his shares and he cannot even obtain the expected value of a new shares". Akerlof's (1970) proposition clearly states that misevaluation of firms is one of the outcomes of asymmetric information problem. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) proposed that voluntary disclosure reduces asymmetric information and lead increment on the stock price. Healy and Palepu (1993) 
III. HYPOTHESES
Unequal access to information may lead to the misevaluation of firms. Two major characteristics of the Turkish football industry lead to unequal information processing. First, generally, arrival of new transfer information occurs before the official announcement of football teams. In this situation, mass media generally releases the information before the contract date, when finalization of transfer is not obvious but probable. Second, false news has a wide coverage in mass media. Football teams deny false news on their official web sites to deal with unequal information processing. Another option to prevent information pollution is to inform investors about the potential transfers at the exact date when the probability of transfer first occurs. This paper concerns the effect of voluntarily negotiation announcements on stock returns. Since the transfer news change investors' beliefs about the future performance of football teams, announcements of negotiations have the information content.
We expect from these changes in the beliefs to lead larger stock returns. On the other hand, since the announcement of signing a contract is delayed information because mass media first release the information about transfer, we expect mandatory contract signing disclosures have no effect on stock returns. All these assumptions are hypothesized as follows; H 1 : Announcements of negotiations made with football players have significant impact on stock returns.
H 2 : Announcements of signing a contract have no impact on stock returns.
IV. METHODOLOGY
The event study methodology is used to prove the hypotheses of the current study. The discussion of event study methodology can be found in Strong (1992) , Mackinlay (1997) , Binder (1998) , Corrado (2011) and Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) . According to Strong (1992) , there are three steps in conducting event study 1) Identifying the event dates 2) Specifying a benchmark model and calculating abnormal returns 3) Statistical tests. Parallel to these steps, we identified the exact dates of announcements of football player transfers in 2010 January and 2012 September. The announcement data have been obtained from the Public Disclosure Platform. The original sample includes 231 transfer announcement displayed on the Public Disclosure Platform. To perform event study methodology, we specified the Market Model to define abnormal returns since The Market Model is widely used model in the event studies moreover it provides smaller variance and correlations across the abnormal returns (Strong, 1992) . The abnormal returns are calculated according to the model presented below, where in this model,R ୫୲ is the market return on the day t and R ୧୲ is the return of stock i on the day t and finally ε ୧୲ is the abnormal return of stock i on the day t.
BIST 100 index is used as a proxy of the market returns. Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are calculated according to the event window (-3;+2) and estimation window (-63;-4) . In other words event window begins 3 days before the announcement day and finishes 2 days after the announcement day. And abnormal returns are estimated over the estimation window which begins 4 days before the announcement day and finishes 63 days before the announcement day.
In order the specify event window, we analyzed graphic of pattern for abnormal returns regarding the several event windows and we concluded that stock returns reaction to disclosures are strongest between the 3 days before and 2 days after the announcement day.
On the other hand, we used 60 days observation for the estimation window since Lambert and Larcker (1985) and Demirer and Kutan (2010) used same estimation period in their studies.
231 ordinary least squares regression were solved according to the equation 1. Model parameters were statistically significant for 109 announcements. Therefore, our sample is reduced to 109 announcements. Final announcement data is stated in the table 1. There are various statistical tests that were developed to conduct the event study analysis. Table 2 states the statistical tests which Event Study Metrics Software can perform.
The statistical tests are explained in the appendix A.
Table II: Statistical tests and their assumptions

Statistical Test Assumptions t-Test
Assumes that 1) the abnormal returns follows a normal distribution 2) Abnormal returns are cross sectionally uncorrelated Patell Z
The standardized residual test is developed by Patell (1976) since the "assumption of identically distributed abnormal returns" may be violated. Boehmer et al.
According to Boehmer et al. (1991) 
it is robust test to event induced variance Corrado Rank Test
The non-parametric test is developed by Corrado (1989) . Distributional assumptions are not necessary for Corrado Rank Test.
Generalized Sign Test
Generalized sign test is based on the portion of positive cumulative abnormal returns over the event window.
V. RESULTS
The pattern of cumulative abnormal returns for both voluntary and mandatory transfer announcements are illustrated in Figure 1 . Figure 1 states that stock returns react to all type of transfer announcements. On the other hand, it is clear that largest reaction is observed to the voluntarily announcement of negotiations. The data in the Table 3 shows that stock returns' reaction to voluntary disclosures is statistically significant at the level of 5% according to all parametric and non-parametric tests. Table 5 and Table 6 show the test statistics according to the announcement types for various event windows. Table 5 indicates that stock reactions to the voluntarily announcement of negotiations are statistically significant for the event windows (-3,3) and(-2,2) according to the T test, Patell Z test and test suggested by Boehmer et al (1991) . Our primary finding is that stock returns reaction to "voluntarily announcement of negotiations" and "mandatory announcement of signing a contract" show parallel tendency within the event window. However, reaction of stock returns to the "announcement of negotiations" is statistically significant, while reaction of stock returns to the "announcement of signing a contract" is not significant. (1) T Test T Statistic is computed according to the equation A.1 and A.2 where CAAR is the cumulated average abnormal returns, N is the number of disclosures in the sample and ‫ܴܣܥ‬ is the cumulated abnormal returns of disclosure i.
Cross sectional T test is computed as formulated in Equaiton A.3 and A.4 where ‫ܴܣܣܥ‬ ௧ is the Cumulated Averge Abnormal returns on event window (t), (ܶ ଵ , ܶ ଶ ) denotes the estimation window. The estimation period is indicated by T which is specified 60 days in this study. 
